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Chapter 1
Introdution
1.1 Bakground
When a produt is malfuntioning, onsumers often seek ompensation from
the manufaturer. Typially the ompensation is a properly funtioning de-
vie, i.e., the devie is repaired and returned to the onsumer. The ompensa-
tion rule is stated by the onsumer law. When the produt is purhased, the
manufaturer has an obligation to ompensate for produts that fail within
a xed time period alled the warranty period. If the warranty period has
already ended, the monetary responsibility of the repair usually belongs to the
onsumer. When there is a third party operating between the manufaturer
and the onsumer, repairing the devies, the proess of nding the responsible
parties is more diult than when ompanies deal diretly with the onsumer.
These repairing vendors at as the onsumer interfae and, from the manufa-
turers' point of view, are the ones reating the warranty laims. The problem in
having these repair vendors is that it leaves possibilities for dishonest warranty
laiming. In the worst ase, dishonesty turns to vendor fraud.
Fraud reates major expenses for ompanies. In 2009, ompanies worldwide
lost about 4.6% of their expenditure, 2.7 trillion dollars in total, due to fraud [20℄.
Most ommon fraud types inlude redit ard, health are, telemarketing and
online advertising fraud, identity theft, software piray and numerous other
sams [42℄. No industry has avoided fraud ompletely. Where there is a pro-
ess involving trust, there is a party breahing the mutual ondene to gain
some unfair or dishonest advantage, i.e. performing fraud [16℄.
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When a warranty laim is made by a repair partner against the manufaturing
ompany, the laim is valid by default. However, as stated above, the part-
nership is easily exposed to fraud. Warranty laims sent by the repair vendors
are sometimes diult to validate, beause the information required for de-
tailed validation is hard to aquire. Furthermore, the validation of a laim is a
omplex and time onsuming proess when the laimant is assumed trustwor-
thy and the repair volume is so great that manual validation is not possible.
The diulty of validation arises when the third party has aess to several
warranty laim items simultaneously, thus either inventing non-existing laims
or reporting higher value laims than neessary, for example. Several other
examples of fraud in warranty laims exist and they evolve onstantly as the
fraud detetion methods beome more sophistiated.
To protet themselves against fraud, organizations have developed ontrolling
tehniques that seek to prevent fraudulent ativity before it auses nanial
impat for the ompany. The ontrolling tehniques an broadly be divided
into tehnial and non-tehnial ontrols. The former are generally operational
and preditive mathematial models, the latter fous on deteting suspiious
human behavior. Non-tehnial ontrols take into aount that for eah pro-
ess there is a human operator [21℄. Here lies the hallenge of fraud detetion;
how to ombine tehnial and non-tehnial ontrols and detet suspiious hu-
man behavior with automated tehnial ontrols? This thesis seeks to answer
this question by studying a hosen mathematial method for behavior identi-
ation. In order to understand the purpose of these methods, a omprehensive
perspetive of fraud is needed.
In addition to the behavioral view of fraud, authors have approahed fraud
ontrol from other perspetives. One view divides fraud ontrolling tasks to
prevention and detetion. Fraud prevention is desribed as the measures to stop
fraud ourring and fraud detetion as identifying fraud as quikly as possible
one it has been perpetrated [5℄. When warranty laim is made, it is diult
to prevent the fraud from ourring; the fraudster may try to gain advantage
with tional laims. More importantly, fraud is to be deteted before it sig-
niantly impats on the manufaturer's earnings. The emphasis in this thesis
is on nding a fraud detetion tool for repair warranty laims that identies
fraudulent patterns in the long run. Creating an all-inlusive fraud detetion
tool is tehnially impossible. Dierent perspetives to fraudulent ations re-
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quire dierent tools. Thus it is better to reate a system to overing eah
aspet of fraud separately. SAS, one of the leading servie management solu-
tion providers, reommends that a omplete fraud detetion system inludes
four dierent ontrolling approahes [18℄:
• Business rules - automati validation
• Anomaly detetion - suspiious data instane reognition
• Advaned analytis - suspiious behavior and pattern reognition
• Soial network analysis - analysis of onnetions of a fraudulent party.
Business rules play the role of fraud prevention from the manufaturer's point
of view. The laims are validated using automated rules learnt from previous
fraud ases. Anomaly detetion tools are then provided to identify anomaly
laims. Advaned analytis loates anomalies from a more general perspetive,
trying to identify the repair partners behaving suspiiously. Finally soial net-
work analysis identies the possibilities of systemati partner fraud. When the
results from these four parts are ombined, the organization is better equipped
to fae the threats. Figure 1.1 gives an overview on the warranty laiming pro-
ess and the relation to fraud ontrol system in the repair laim ase.
Figure 1.1: Warranty laim proess and fraud ontrol. Soial network analysis
is valid in eah point of the gure.
As an be seen from gure 1.1, the sooner fraud is identied, the smaller the
manufaturers losses are. Thus business rules are the most ost eient tool
for fraud detetion. The identiation of new business rules takes plae in the
advaned analytis setion. New fraud patterns and behaviors indiate new
rules that need to be implemented. Advaned analytis tools are not the most
eient nanially in the present, but important for the future fraud preven-
tion. This thesis studies the possibilities of advaned analytis in warranty
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laim area.
Advaned analysis in pratie is the use of mathematial tools and tehniques.
Some of these tehniques, lustering for example, an also be implemented in
anomaly detetion. The dierene between these two fraud detetion steps
is small. Only the objetives dier; anomaly detetion seeks single repair
anomalies while advaned analytis fouses on suspiious repair partner iden-
tiation. The tools for the latter ase are various, but the basi idea is always
similar; ompare the reent ativity with the historial ativity. The ompari-
son is made possible with proles, whih represent the historial ativities. The
methods dier in how the data is presented with the proles. One possibility
for a prole, presented more thoroughly later in this thesis, is to present the
data with signatures [12℄. By denition, signatures are joint probabilities that
are built from onditional probability distributions. They present the proba-
bilisti behavior of a repair partner. This proling method has been used in
the literature in anomaly detetion. For instane, eah new repair ativity an
be given a fraud sore, based on how likely or unlikely the ativity is ompared
to the partners signature [8℄. Signatures and fraud detetion will be disussed
more in setion 2.3.1.
1.2 Objetives
This thesis examines the use of signatures in fraud detetion. The emphasis
will be on identifying behavioral anomalies among the repair partners. In the
following text, repair partners will be referred to as aounts.
Majority of fraud detetion literature onentrates on labeling aounts or data
objets as fraudulent or normal. However, the term fraudulent aount is a
strong expression and labeling a repair partner as fraudulent is potentially of-
fensive. A better expression in this ontext is suspiious aount, that states
that the aount is behaving dierently than others and should be taken into
further inspetion. Furthermore, beause the data used in this thesis omes
from an international onsumer eletronis ompany, already the loal regu-
lations reate anomaly behaviors that the data analyst may not be aware of.
These behaviors also need to be pointed out. The purpose of the tool dis-
ussed in this thesis is to give the auditors a primary set of aounts where
they should start looking for fraud. For advaned analytis purposes, two
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dierent anomaly detetion approahes are applied. First, the initialization
dataset is analyzed to nd aounts already diering from others. Seond, a
testing dataset is analyzed for behavioral hanges.
This thesis answers to the following researh questions.
• What are histogram signatures and how do they present the data?
• How an histogram signatures be used in deteting warranty fraud?
1.3 Struture
The proess of anomalous behavior detetion has multiple steps. The disus-
sion in this thesis, respetively, has been divided into three main topis
1. Proling - reating histogram signatures
2. Clustering - reognition of anomalies
3. Behavioral outlier detetion - peer group analysis
The next hapter presents the literature in the area of warranty laim fraud
and how signature based fraud detetion an be applied to real data from the
literature perspetive. Two separate methods are presented; one for the initial
outlier aount detetion and one for the behavioral hange detetion. The
hapter also introdues dierent measures for signature distane. The third
hapter desribes the data struture and fraudulent aounts used in the anal-
ysis are desribed. This hapter also presents the signature reation proess
and disusses the speial harateristis of fraud detetion methods with signa-
tures. The fourth hapter presents the results of the signature method. Finally,
the results of the thesis are summarized and the future areas of appliation of
the proposed method are disussed.
7
Chapter 2
Anomaly detetion methods in
fraud appliations
Fraud detetion is one topi in anomaly detetion. Other anomaly dete-
tion appliations inlude intrusion, medial information, damage and textual
anomaly detetion and image proessing. Depending on the anomaly detetion
appliation, some tehniques are more eient than others. Dierent anomaly
detetion tehniques inlude methods suh as lassiation, lustering, nearest
neighbor searh and statistial analysis [10℄. This hapter disusses rst the
qualities of warranty fraud and then the methods that seem best suited for
histogram signatures.
2.1 Warranty fraud
The priniple of warranty laim proess with repair vendors was disussed
in setion 1.1. Despite of a good validation system, fraudulent aounts are
often able to identify the loopholes in the system and irumvent these auto-
mated, often rule-based validators. Estimates of the perentage of fraud osts
out of the total warranty osts dier between 10 and 15 perentages [18℄. To
strengthen the warranty fraud detetion system, ompanies perform both au-
dits and mathematial analysis with the laim data. The aounts may get
single fraudulent laims through the system, but what is espeially ostly for
the ompany is the ontinuous exploitation of the system. This usually means
that the behavior of the aount hanges after the loophole in the fraud de-
tetion system has been found. The fraud detetion method should nd this
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hange.
One of the harateristis of warranty laim fraud is that the denition of
fraud is quite ambiguous. Most unseen laims are not neessarily fraud, but
should raise suspiion. For example, if the repair partner laims a repair
done for a devie that they have never repaired before, the reason behind this
an be that the devie has only reently ome to the markets in whih the
repair partner is working. However, it an also be that the devie is not in
the surrounding market but the repair partner has reeived information on a
devie for whih they ould falsely reate laims. These types of situations
are rare, but possible. Even if the denition of fraud is fuzzy, there are diret
rules that an be reated for validation purposes. For instane, there are sets
of attributes for eah laim that do not allow other attributes. The validation
rules suh as mathing attribute denitions an be based on the devie details,
for example some ars require a spei engine, and if a repair partner would
try to replae the engine with a non-mathing engine, the laim would not be
validated.
Another harateristi of warranty fraud is that eah aount an have either
very similar behavior as other aounts and their behavior an be ompletely
unique. The diulty is that both ases may or may not inlude fraud. For
instane, there are networks of repair partners, and if these partners were to
perform fraud, their proles would be very similar, beause they would have the
same ways of working. At the same time the partners ould belong to dierent
markets whih would suggest that the repair portfolio should be dierent. On
the other hand, the proles would be similar also if the environment in whih
repairs are generated is similar. Furthermore, if the repair partner diers
greatly from the others, it may be due to ontratual agreements between
the manufaturing ompany and the repair partner and thus would not be an
indiator of fraud. There are several ases where dierenes may arise and
it is diult to say what the reason for the dierene is. Despite of all the
exeptions, suh as those desribed above, the behavioral dierene ompared
to others is a good starting point for fraud investigation.
The biggest fraud indiator with warranty laims is behavioral hange. The
identiation of this hange has been studied in literature, but it has onen-
trated merely on the behavior hange within one aount [14, 15℄. However,
what ounts as a behavioral hange in warranty fraud eld, must be ompared
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against similarly behaving aounts. New methods have been developed to
detet the behavioral hange relative to the behavior of an aount's peers [5℄.
One suh method, alled peer group analysis, is disussed in setion 2.4.4.
2.2 Fraud detetion
Fraud detetion tehniques an be ategorized in several ways. For instane,
ategorization an be based on input data type or on outlier denition. When
the ategorization is based on data type, there are three ategories; unsuper-
vised, supervised and semi-supervised methods [10℄.
• Unsupervised anomaly detetion does not make any assumptions about
the data before analysis. It is not known whether the analyzed data
instanes are already fraudulent or normal. The fraudulent behavior
is neither known. The purpose of this data mining is to disover the
anomaly patterns, instanes or behaviors. Beause fraudulent behavior
in the warranty laiming proess is mostly previously unseen patterns,
unsupervised methods are the most useful methods in warranty fraud
detetion.
• Supervised anomaly detetion learns from previous fraud. One they
nd similar behavior than what is earlier dened as fraudulent, or not
normal, an alarm is issued. Most rule-based anomaly detetion methods
are supervised methods.
• Semi-supervised anomaly detetion ombines the two approahes above.
Unsupervised methods are rst applied to the data to nd the anoma-
lous data instanes and supervised learning methods are then taught
aording to the ndings. The whole fraud detetion system in war-
ranty laiming works in a semi-supervised manner. The business rules
are reated through the ndings of advanes analytis.
Another example of the ways how anomaly detetion methods an be atego-
rized is based on the outlier type. An outlier has been dened as
an observation that deviates so muh from other observations as to arouse
suspiion that it was generated by a dierent mehanism [23℄.
This denition does not assume anything about the measurement of deviations.
Authors have drawn their own onlusions about how deviation is dened and
this has reated another ategorization for outlier detetion methods. Devi-
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ation has been inluded in the denition of dierent outlier types that the
anomaly detetion methods are able to identify. The most ommon outlier
types inlude distribution, distane, deviation or density based outliers. Other
outlier types inlude depth, lustering, sub spae, support vetor and neural
network based outliers [26℄. The denitions of these outlier types an be found
in Appendix A.1. When the dierent outlier types are put into warranty
laim fraud ontext, some are more suitable than others. The most suitable
types are distane, deviation and density based outliers. Distane based out-
liers are by denition distant from others [27℄. Distane alulation method
varies, but the outlier soring is based on the diret distane. For example,
if the laiming volume were to be used as the distane measure and if the
normal laim volume was low, the aount laiming the most would appear
as the biggest outlier. Deviation based outliers have harateristis that other
aounts do not [2℄. If, for instane, an aount was reporting all laims in
the middle of the night, and the laiming hour was inluded in the analyzed
harateristis, the aount would appear abnormal. Finally, density based
outliers tend to ombine these approahes by onsidering also the similarities
of other aounts [7℄. If ten aounts were laiming ve to ten laims daily,
and other ten aounts reporting 150 to 200 laims with equal variane, these
would not appear as outliers, beause they are in their own neighborhoods.
However, if one aount was laiming, say, 50 laims a day, that would appear
as an outlier beause it would lie far from all the other aounts' groups.
Data and outlier types are harateristis of the outlier detetion methods.
Dierent methods an further be divided based on their performane idea.
Table 2.1 summarizes the most ommon anomaly detetion methods.
In fraud detetion, lassiation tehniques have been highly popular beause
of the supervised nature. Data objets an be labeled as fraudulent or normal
based on previous knowledge of fraud. However, in the ontext of this thesis,
there is no diret knowledge of fraud available. As disussed in the previous
setion, behavioral hange is the best indiator of fraud. Deteting behavioral
hanges requires the similarity between aounts to be dened and similarity
in terms of warranty fraud is omplex. Business environment, time of the year
or the aount ontrat an determine the behavior of an aount and thus
reates similarity between ertain aounts. This similarity an be measured
for instane with laim volumes or laim harateristi distributions.
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Table 2.1: Statistial methods in fraud detetion [10℄
Method Idea
Classiation based Classiation of data instanes into
fraudulent or normal instanes
Clustering based Data objets are lustered and the objets
furthest from other objets in lusters are
identied as outliers. Also small lusters
an be onsidered as outlying lusters.
Nearest neighbor based The objets that are furthest from their
nearest neighbors are outliers.
Statistial Outliers are those objets that do not
follow a probabilisti model.
Information theoreti Outliers indue irregular information
in the data.
Spetral Outliers an be seen after projetion of
data into lower dimensional spae.
Similarity measures, fraud omplexity, data availability and other harateris-
tis limit the usability of ertain anomaly detetion methods. Taking a dierent
point of view, the following requirements for warranty fraud detetion system
an be listed. The method must have
• Memory. The history of an aount denes the behavior [8℄.
• Ability to adapt. It must detet various anomalies that have not been
seen before [14℄.
• Ability to learn from others. Even if the behavior is new for the aount
itself, it may be normal aording to others.
The next setions introdue dierent unsupervised outlier detetion methods
that ompare the similarities of aounts and try to fulll the requirements of
eient warranty fraud detetion system.
2.3 Proling
Data proessing where the struture of the data is summarized into ompo-
nents with some set of attributes is alled proling [10℄. It is important to
reognize the orret approah to summarize data. For example, if labeled
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data is available and the ways to perform fraud are stable, it is logial to build
one ommon fraud prole and ompare the data objets against this. How-
ever, when the data is not labeled, one may reate a prole for eah performer
and try to identify possibly fraudulent hanges in the prole. Some methods
detet several dierent variables for a proles behavior, reate rules for normal
behavior and trae the dierenes may present fraud. Suh a method has been
applied for example to trak fraud in mobile phone usage [14, 15℄.
It an be noted that there are various ways to build proles. In addition to
detetion of diret variable values, one an use joint probability distributions
as aount signatures [12℄. These signatures an then be applied to fraud
detetion [8℄. This thesis follows these joint probability distribution signatures
as proles.
2.3.1 Signatures
When the values of a variable are disrete, the probability distribution of
this variable is often presented using histograms. The probability slots of a
histogram are alled bins. The benet of histograms over other tools is the
ease of understanding and omputation. When timing information is also
available, histograms do not prioritize reent transations over older ones but
put the same emphasis on eah transation. Sometimes the loss of timing
is seen as a problem. For example, the repair ativities in a repair enter
are likely to hange as the onsumer needs hange. These types of hanges
are important to notie. This problem an be avoided with a periodi re-
omputing of the histograms. Another diulty with histograms ours if the
data is multidimensional and the histograms also need to be multidimensional.
To overome the multidimensionality problem, joint probability distributions
are presented with histograms [12℄. This joint probability distribution is alled
an aount's signature. Signatures reate an individual prole for eah aount.
The ability to present the behavior of an aount with probability distributions
reates the ore of signature methods' eieny. Furthermore, this ability fail-
itates the use of signatures in fraud detetion. Eah new transation, for whih
the signatures are built on, an be ompared against the historial signature
and sored for suspiiousness [8℄. The simpliity of histogram signatures is one
of their biggest advantages. Before histogram signatures were applied to fraud
13
detetion, the prole for an aount was reated by determining the normal
harateristis of an aount [15℄. This view is more omplex omputationally.
Mathematial formulation of histogram signatures is as follows. Let Xn =
(Xn,1, Xn,2, ..., Xn,M) be a reported transation for an aount withM dierent
variables at time n. The joint probability distribution for a transation is
dened as
Pn(Xn) = Pn(Xn,1)Pn(Xn,2|Xn,1)...Pn(Xn,M |Xn,1, ..., Xn,M−1), (2.3.1)
where the onditional probability distributions P (X|Y ) are signature ompo-
nents. Histograms are a good hoie to represent distributions. They lower the
amount of information that needs to be stored, beause only the sizes of the
bins have to be remembered. A benet of histograms is that they an be used
for both ategorial and ontinuous variables. When used with ontinuous
variables, data needs proper disretization.
When histogram signatures are designed, the hoie of variables is important,
beause the histograms are built for eah ombination of variables. Compu-
tational eieny dereases, if there are too many histograms. The statistial
signiane of onditioning variables for an aount an be tested with a χ2
test [12℄. The test is similar to Pearson's hi-squared test, trying to identify
whether the onditioning hanges the distribution of the signature variable too
muh, ompared to the distribution without onditioning. The idea is to alu-
late an expeted distribution for eah onditioning ategory and ompare the
true distribution against it. Only those ategories where the ount is greater
than a pre-dened threshold are inluded in the distribution omparisons. This
ensures the statistial reliability of the test. The χ2 test statisti is alulated
for eah aount separately. The purpose of the test is to nd those variables
that are signiant for most of the aounts and highly signiant for at least
some of the aounts. The variables that ll these onditions are then used as
the signature omponents in (2.3.1).
One diulty with histogram signatures is how to dene the set of variables
properly and what will be the optimal level for the number of histogram binsK.
One approah is to nd the number of bins K that maximizes the information
entropy (see setion 2.3.3) of the histogram. Information entropy measures the
level of information within a distribution [40℄. If target behavior is available,
authors reommend to maximize average weighted Kullbak-Leibler measure
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(see setion 2.3.3) instead of information entropy [12, 8℄. Using the average
weighted Kullbak-Leibler measure the target behavior an be emphasized as
muh as is required by the analyst. Kullbak-Leibler alulates the level of
dierene in information entropy.
One of the benets of the histogram method is that we do not have to store all
data, but just the histogram probabilities of eah aount. Adding new data
to the histogram probabilities an be done easily by
An = (1− w)An−1 + wXn, (2.3.2)
where An−1 is the bin probability after n−1 observations and Xn is a vetor of
ones where the n-th observation belongs to and zero elsewhere. The weighting
parameter 0 < w < 1 an be linked to the number of observations wn =
1
n−1
,
when the signature presents the whole history of transations. The downside of
this is that the behavior of an aount may have hanged, whih is not properly
taken into aount. Naturally, the behavior hange may be an indiator of
fraud but an also indiate a hange in the laimed produt maturity.
To better suite this problem of preferred information, there are other ways to
update the histogram. One possibility is to use exponentially weighted moving
average and x the weight wn = wn−1 [12, 30, 13℄. The loser w is to zero,
the less it takes the most reent observations into aount and the better the
reent history is remembered. If, for example, w = 0.05, the observation that
ourred ten updating rounds ago, has now only 60% of its original value. To
larify, say some observation has been the only observation in its ategory, the
probability value of this observation is 100%. After ten dierent observations,
however, the probability of this original observation is only 60%. If the number
of observations was known, and the new data was not updated, the probability
would equal to the relative frequeny of the observation. When weighting is
used, the number of observations before the last ten observations does not
matter.
In addition to the updating proess, time information an be seen in signatures
as a variable. For instane, if the reporting frequeny was to be deteted, it is
presented as a variable onditioned on other variables. The reporting frequeny
an also be a onditioning variable with a proper disretization.
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2.3.2 Initialization of a signature
When a new aount appears, a new signature needs to be initialized. The
idea is to use an indexing variable Z that groups the onditioning variables.
For instane, if daily warranty laim volumes are grouped with the onditional
variable suh that [0 ≤ x1 < 10, 10 ≤ x2 < 20...], the indexing variable may
have a grouping of [0 ≤ x1 < 30, 30 ≤ x2 < 60, ...]. After the rst transations
of an aount have taken plae, the signature histogram an be estimated using
the average distribution over all other aounts that are indexed with Z [12℄.
The importane of indexing by Z is determined with overage of Z, whih is
the fration of ustomers for whom the indexing is useful, and average value of
Z, whih is the average distane of indexed and non-indexed signature ompo-
nents. If there are several indexing variables available, the most eetive value
is hosen as the indexing.
2.3.3 Distanes between histograms
Having an aount signature raises the question how to measure the dier-
ene, or similarity of signatures? Beause the behavior of a laiming aount
depends on several environmental and bakground fators, the similarity of
two aounts must be addressable.
Let P and Q be the signatures of two aounts and pkǫP and qkǫQ partition
probabilities of these signatures with k = 1...K partitions. A ommon distane
measure used in the literature [5, 44, 10℄ is the Eulidean distane
DE(P,Q) =
√∑
i
(pi − qi). (2.3.3)
The Eulidean distane is best suited for ontinuous variables that follow Gaus-
sian distribution. When alulating the distane over the whole histogram
probability distribution, with no assumptions about the shape of the distribu-
tion, Eulidean distane is not the best measure.
If the histogram variables are not derived from the Gaussian distribution, the
assoiation between these an be alulated with Spearman orrelation [33℄
ρ =
∑
i (xi − x)(yi − y)√∑
i (xi − x)
2
∑
i (yi − y)
2
, (2.3.4)
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where xi and yi are the rankings of i
th
observation and x and y are the av-
erage of these ranks. Beause the orrelation is alulated for eah signature
histogram separately, sum of these orrelations an be taken as the similarity
measure. The problem with Spearman orrelation as a distane, however, is
that it neglets the atual probability values of the observations.
A popular method for distribution similarity alulations is to use entropy as
a baseline for alulations. Several methods are based on Shannon's entropy
[19, 40, 41℄
H(P ) = −
KP∑
k=1
pk log pk, (2.3.5)
where pk is the probability of k
th
partition and KP the number of parti-
tions [34℄. In multiple dimensions entropy an be summed over the attribute
entropies [26, 25℄.
The atual entropy based distane measure has several modiations. One
modiation is a mutual information measure between P and Q
DMI(P ;Q) = −
KP∑
i=1
pi
KQ∑
j=1
p(qj|pi) log
p(qj |pi)
qj
, (2.3.6)
where p(qj |pi) is onditional probability of Q given P and qj is the probability
of jth partition in Q [1℄.
As disussed in setion 2.3.1, average weighted Kullbak-Leibler (AWKL) dis-
tane has been popular in histogram signature omparison.
DAWKL(P,Q) = −
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
w
K∑
k=1
pi,k log
pi,k
qi,k
+ (1− w)
K∑
k=1
qi,k log
qi,k
pi,k
)
,
(2.3.7)
where the weighting parameter 0 < w < 1 an be modied for proper om-
parison of a distribution against some target distribution. If Q represented
a target signature, the seletion of w would distinguish between the ability
to avoid inorret grouping (w = 1) and the ability to trak the individual
behavior (w = 0) [8℄.
Taneja [40℄ disussed optional distane metris, for example Jensen dierene
divergene measure also known as Jensen-Shannon divergene or an informa-
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tion radius
DJENSEN(P,Q) =
n∑
i=1
(
pi log pi + qi log qi
2
− (
pi + qi
2
) log (
pi + qi
2
)
)
. (2.3.8)
That is, Jensen dierene divergene presents the average relative entropy of
the soure distributions to the average distribution
P+Q
2
[35℄.
Whih metri to use, depends on the purpose. AWKL works well with a on-
tinuous data that overs all the histogram bins. When the other ompared
histogram inludes empty bins, and the other histogram is omplete, Jensen
dierene divergene gives the best results. It works the best beause zero
probability does not ause the probability in the other histogram to be forgot-
ten. With other distane measures zero probability makes the total distane
zero.
One must note that these entropy based measures are not metris, beause
they do not ll the triangle inequality onditionD(P,R) ≤ D(P,Q)+D(Q,R).
However, the square root of Jensen dierene divergene measure (2.3.8) lls
this ondition and is a metri [39℄. Thus Jensen dierene divergene measure
an be used to dene the similarity distanes between two disrete distributions
and use it for example in lustering and nearest neighbor searhes [31℄.
The measures desribed above alulate the dierenes between two probability
distributions. The dierene in (2.3.8) an be generalized to a population of
N distributions by
DJENSEN(P1, ...PN) =
n∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
wipi,j log pi,j −
(
N∑
i=1
wipi,j
)
log
N∑
i=1
wipi,j
)
,
(2.3.9)
where
∑
wi = 1 [35℄.
The seletion of distane measure depends on the used data. A set of studies
have been onduted on the optimum distane measure with varying set of
measures and dierent datasets. The onlusions of these studies have been
similar; the seletion of the distane measure needs to be adjusted aording
to the studied data, beause dierent measures are able to identify unlike
dierenes [11, 6℄.
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2.4 Unsupervised fraud detetion
In the eld of warranty laim fraud detetion, labeled data is rare. Unsu-
pervised outlier detetion methods are thus a logial hoie. Many outlier
detetion methods an be used in an unsupervised mode. The most ommon
methods are methods that seek to identify data objets that loate in eah
other's proximity and sore the furthest objets as outliers. Clustering and
nearest neighbor based methods represent this method ategory.
Clustering and nearest neighbor searh are similar methods. Both depend on
the performane of the distane measure, implying that the hoie of data
preproessing tehnique is important. The importane is only inreased with
ategorial data [3℄. The dierene of these two method types is that lus-
tering tehniques alulate the distane of the data instane with the whole
luster while nearest neighbor methods measure the distane with the loal
neighborhood of the data instane [10℄. It is diult to state whih of the
approahes is more orret and both of the methods should be examined with
the data available.
Both tehniques have problems. One problem with lustering as an outlier
detetion method is that they were originally developed to identify lusters, not
outliers. The reent shift in fous towards more data driven outlier detetion
methods has also driven the development of luster based outlier detetion
methods. The problem with nearest neighbors is that if the data points have
diering number of neighbors, the method fails to identify the outliers or label
normal data instanes inorretly as outliers.
2.4.1 Clustering
There are three main lustering methods that several artiles have onentrated
on. These are k-means, k-medoids, and hierarhial lustering tehniques.
The basi idea in k-means and k-medoids lustering is to guess an initial set
of k luster enters and apply a minimization algorithm to the data until a
global minimum of total distanes from the luster enters is minimized. The
dierene between k-means and k-medoids is that k-means uses Eulidean
distane as objet distane while with k-medoids the objet distanes an be
determined by any dissimilarity measure. Hierarhial lustering diers from
these methods in the initial approah. The lusters are reated step by step,
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rst ombining the most similar data objets. Clustering ends when either
the wanted number of lusters is found or the smallest distane left exeed a
determined threshold [22℄.
The optimal lustering to k lusters is diult. Optimality of lustering an
be evaluated for instane by partitioning the ontinuous variables to reate
disrete distributions and then use entropy to ompare these partitions. Op-
timal lustering based on this partitioning is able to detet dierent types
and sizes of lusters [17℄. However, this does not onsider the optimal num-
ber of lusters. Literature inludes several measures to ompare lusterings
with dierent numbers of lusters, suh as Bayesian information riteria, F-
statistis, oeient of separation and partition oeient. Eah measure has
its own appliation areas. Many measures are applied to probabilisti lus-
tering, where the number of parameters is an important issue. One measure
that does not fous on the number of parameters and is thus well appliable
to this thesis is silhouette oeient. It ts well to distane based lusters.
It ompares the average distane of a point x to other members in its luster
C, a(x) = 1
|C|−1
∑
yǫC d(x, y) with the average distane to members in seond
best tting luster G, b = minG 6=C(
1
|G|
∑
yǫG d(x, y)). The average of silhouette
oeient s(x) = b(x)−a(x)
max{a(x),b(x)}
indiates how aurate the lustering is.
Clustering as an outlier detetion method has three basi approahes how to
distinguish between normal data and outliers. First, the normal data instanes
are expeted to belong to a luster. Data objets that do not belong to any
lusters are outliers. Seond, the normal data instanes are expeted to lie
lose to the luster entroid and outliers loate on the edges of the lusters.
Third, normal data builds large and dense lusters while outliers have only few
partners in their luster [10℄. Eah of these approahes may raise suspiion on
dierent aounts. It needs to be examined whih approah nds the best
outliers in warranty laim data.
2.4.2 Nearest neighbors
The basi idea of nearest neighbor analysis as an outlier detetion method
is to alulate the distane of data objets from their losest neighbors and
point out the objets that lay far from their neighbors. The eieny of suh
methods depends on the applied similarity measure.
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In addition to the hoie of similarity measure, the performane of nearest
neighbor methods depends on the seletion riteria of neighbors. The neighbors
an be seleted based on two separate parameters, the number of neighbors or
the distane from the data objet. Methods based on the number of neighbors
alulate the outlier sore aording to the average distane. Methods based
on the distane riteria ount the neighbors loating loser than the riteria
and sores the data objets as outliers if the neighborhood is sare. These
method riteria often fail to identify outliers if the data density varies. To
overome this problem, some methods have been developed to onsider also
the density of the neighborhood. One density based method is introdued in
the next setion.
2.4.3 Loal outliers
Loal outliers loate further from their losest neighbors than an average neigh-
bor of those neighbors. Eah data objet is given an outlier sore alled loal
outlier fator (LOF) [7℄. To introdue this measure, a few helping alula-
tions need to be introdued. K-distance(p) alulates the distane to the k-th
nearest observation, where k is determined by the analyzer.
k-distance(p) = d(p, o) s.t.

 for at most k o
′ǫD\{p} d(p, o′) ≤ d(p, o)
for at most k-1 o′ǫD\{p} d(p, o′) < d(p, o),
(2.4.1)
where D is a set of data objets. K-distane neighborhood inludes the obser-
vations that are among the k nearest neighbors.
Nk-distance(p)(p) = {q ǫ D| d(p, q) ≤ k-distance(p)} (2.4.2)
Reahability distane identies whether an observation, for whih the outlier
fator is alulated, also belongs to the K-distane neighborhood of its near-
est neighbors. Furthermore, loal reahability density denes the density of
observations for whih the previous statement is true.
reach-distk(p, o) = max{k-distance(o), d(p, o)} (2.4.3)
lrdk(p) =
(∑
oǫNk(p)
reach-distk(p, i)
|Nk(p)|
)−1
, (2.4.4)
where |Nk(p)| is the number of observations in the neighborhood, i.e. k.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of loal outlier fator alulation.
Finally, loal outlier fator an be alulated using these results.
LOFk(p) =
∑
oǫNk(p)
lrdk(o)
lrdk(p)
|Nk(p)|
(2.4.5)
Reach-distk(p, o) dereases the statistial utuations of loal outlier fator
when n > 2. As an be seen from the denition of LOF, the performane of
LOF relates losely to the number of neighbors taken into aount. LOF aims
at identifying density based outliers eiently.
Looking at gure 2.1, if the loal outlier fator is alulated onsidering four
losest peers, data objets A and C both have their own lear neighborhoods.
Those neighborhoods do not have the same density, but the all the members are
eah other's' losest neighbors, and will get LOF value 1. The neighborhood for
objet B has greater distanes from the objet B. When the loal outlier fator
for objet B is alulated, loal reahability density nds out the neighborhood
densities of the losest neighbors, inluding objet D and the objets in the
neighborhood of objet A. Beause these objets in the neighborhood of B do
not have objet B in their neighborhood, objet B will get high loal outlier
fator value.
The advantage of loal outlier fator is that it onsiders only the loal dif-
ferenes of data instanes. However, this an be a disadvantage as well. For
example, if the losest data instanes of an outlier are also outliers and loat-
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ing far from all the others, LOF-sore would remain low. Thus the hoie of
number of neighbors inluded in the LOF alulation is important.
2.4.4 Behavioral hange analysis
Clustering and nearest neighbor analysis methods are the best in data mining
tasks where the data set does not evolve over time. However, in many applia-
tions, espeially in fraud detetion, the development over time is an important
inuener. Similar to nearest neighbor tehniques, peer group analysis ompare
an aount against its nearest neighbors and further trak the development of
their aounts and sore the aounts aording to their hanges [4℄. This
method is unsupervised outlier detetion method beause it does not require
labels in the data but fouses on omparing the hanges within an aount.
Break point analysis, on the other hand, detets the within aount hanges
and sores the aounts based on the historial hanges within the aount [5℄.
Ativity monitoring is similar to break point analysis, giving anomaly sores
for eah data instane based on its suspiious attributes [15℄. The suspiious-
ness of an attribute needs to be learnt from historial data. Although proven
very useful in redit ard fraud detetion, ativity monitoring is not appliable
in this system, beause of the lak of knowledge in suspiious behavior. Peer
group analysis on the other hand onsiders the relation to neighbor aounts
and is valuable in the ontext of this thesis.
Peer group analysis is based on signatures. The type of the signature is not
important for the performane of the method. The original artile studied
signatures based on single values of dierent variables, but there is no reason
why the signatures introdued in setion 2.3.1 ould not be used. The idea to
detet behavioral hanges in aounts diers from lustering methods suh that
they do not try to group the whole data to lusters but ompare eah aount
individually against the losest similar aounts. Thus the initial set up for
the outlier detetion requires determining of the nearest neighbors. Beause
the variane within the neighborhood is relevant, the original authors of peer
group analysis used diret distane to determine a rst set of nearest neighbors
and then further seleted those nearest neighbors j that had the least dierent
variane (V arDiff) from the target aount Ai
V arDiff(Ai, Aj) = (var(Ai)− var(Aj))(var(Ai)− var(Aj))
′
(2.4.6)
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The auray of lustering methods depends often on the number of observa-
tions in the luster. Similarly, peer group analysis performs dierently when
the number of peers varies. Furthermore, the performane of this method
depends on the hoie of distane measure. Similarly to lustering methods,
with ontinuous variables Eulidean distane and variane are the rst measure
hoies to nd the peers for aounts. Signatures based on histogram prob-
abilities require some other distane measure. The proper distane measure
was disussed in setion 2.3.3.
The atual outlier detetion method in peer group analysis is simple. Peer
group denes the target behavior T , and if the behavior Ai,j of an aount j
at time i deviates greatly from this target, it is agged as an outlier. Three
measures an be used as the average performane measure of the group. These
measures are entroid, trimmed entroid and medoid. For instane, entroid
Ti,j is dened
Ti =
1
npeer
npeer∑
j=1
Ai,j. (2.4.7)
Peer group analysis also onsiders the dispersion of aounts over time
Vi =
1
npeer − 1
npeer∑
j=1
(Ai,j − Ti)(Ai,j − Ti)
′. (2.4.8)
The agging sore for eah aount is determined with the variane Vi and
group performer Ti
Ci,j = (Ai,j −Ti)
′(Vi)
−1(Ai,j −Ti). (2.4.9)
Peer group analysis requires quite large dataset to perform eiently [4℄. The
size of the dataset may vary quite a lot, depending on the level of detailed
information. Oasionally it is more relevant to study a smaller sample of
similar aounts to detet the most deviating aounts. Beause of this, one
peer group size does not engage all the needed details to lassify outliers from
normal data.
The performane of peer group analysis has been studied in redit ard fraud.
Results show that peer group analysis is very promising in deteting suspiious
aounts, and should be a part of an eient fraud deteting system. Moreover,
results imply that peer groups that are built with three months of redit ard
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data is good to detet fraud, but a robust peer group building time annot
be estimated [44℄. The timeframe used for building the aount signatures in
warranty fraud ontext thus needs to be studied arefully.
2.5 Detetion method performane metris
The outome from a fraud detetion method is an outlier sore for eah data
objet. Objets with highest sore are then dened fraudulent. When true
labels an be determined for the data objets, one an alulate the perfor-
mane of the method with dierent performane measures. Perentages of
orretly identied fraud ases (TP), orretly identied normal ases (TN),
falsely identied normal ases (FF) and falsely identied normal ases (FN) are
ommon performane measures [10℄. More advaned measures alulate ratios
between falsely and orretly labeled data objets. For instane, the reeiver
operating harateristis urve (ROC-urve) shows the trade-o between TP
and FF perentages [9℄. However, these metris are appliable only if fraudu-
lent and normal aounts an be identied. When labels are not available, the
performane of the method needs to be laried from the data by using ase
by ase outlier analysis.
Ahieving a orret outlier sore for data objets is the goal of the detetion
methods. When several types of outliers exist, and also several types of outliers
appear, the soring beomes more diult. Several soures in the literature
onentrate on methods that disover only one type of outliers. However,
one option for outlier soring is to use a ombinatorial model, where several
loal outliers are rst individually observed and later ombined to global out-
liers [36℄.
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Chapter 3
Preparation of aount
signatures for fraud detetion
3.1 Data struture
The data set used in this thesis ontains warranty laim data from a onsumer
eletronis ompany. It onsists of a large number of rows, N > 2000000.
Eah row ontains information variables, suh as laiming date and aount
information, and a number of ategorial attributes xi,j,k. In this thesis, three
attributes have been seleted randomly to represent the laim details. Eah
data instane Xi,j for aount i at time j is dened by these three ategorial
variables. Categorial variables have limitations in what ombinations they
an have. There are 7 dierent ategories for X1, 20 ategories for X2 and 52
ategories for variable X3. Furthermore, there are only 124 ategories when
the data is ategorized based on variables X1 and X2. If the absolute possible
values of X1 and X2 are multiplied, whih equals to 140, it an be seen that
there are 16 ategory ombinations that are not valid. Similarly, the ombi-
nation of variables X2 and X3 an have 320 dierent ombinations and nally
ategorizations over all three variables reahes 1535 ombinations of variables.
The numbers of possible variable ombinations an be seen in table 3.1.
The numbers of ombinations are smaller than the produt of the number of
absolute ategories beause the repairing proess only allows ertain repairing
features to be ombined. Other ombinations are automatially delined when
the laim is sent for validation. When the orret ombination of variables is
seleted, the data is divided into probability bins desribed in setion 2.3.1.
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Table 3.1: Variable ategory summary. Xi|Xj means that the data is divided
into ategories by Xi onditioned on X2.
Variable ombination Nr of ategories
X1 7
X2 20
X3 52
X2|X1 124
X3|X2 320
X3|X2|X1 1365
The following example laries the situation.
3.1.1 Data example
Table 3.2: An invented example of the data struture for one aount.
Day Cost Diulty Duration Repairs
1 Cheap Easy Week 1
1 Cheap Easy 3 Hours 3
1 Expensive Easy Hour 2
1 Expensive Diult 3 Hours 1
2 Cheap Easy Month 2
2 Cheap Easy Day 1
2 Cheap Easy 3 Hours 2
2 Expensive Easy Hour 1
3 Cheap Easy Month 2
3 Cheap Easy Day 3
3 Cheap Easy Week 1
3 Expensive Diult 3 Hours 1
4 Cheap Easy Week 1
4 Cheap Easy 3 Hours 4
Eah repair an be assumed to have 3 parameters; ost, diulty and duration.
The example dimensions are purely hypothetial. The letters in brakets below
are linked to gure 3.1; they present the value of the ategory.
• The repair is either heap (C) or expensive (E)
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• There are easy (e) and diult repairs (d). Only expensive repairs an
be diult.
• The ustomer an deide when he or she wants the repair to be ready.
Cheap repair an last 3 hours (3h), a day (da), a week (w) or a month
(m) and expensive repair lasts either one hour (h) if it is easy or three
hours if it is diult.
Table 3.2 shows the example data struture. Data overs four days of data
and is presented for one aount only. The last olumn shows the summarized
repair volume for eah ombination of ategories.
Table 3.3 presents the ategorial ombinations in this example similarly to
table 3.1. These ombinations ould be available only for one aount, while
other aounts an do also expensive repairs that last for a week for example.
When the signatures are ompared against eah other, the missing ombina-
tions are those that may be ontributing to the distane the most. The next
setions present how the signatures are reated from the dataset.
Table 3.3: Variable ategory summary for the example.
Variable ombination Nr of ategories
Cost 2
Diulty 2
Duration 5
Diulty | Cost 3
Duration | Diulty 6
Duration | Diulty | Cost 6
3.2 Signatures
The data set inludes three ategorial variables and one alulated variable.
The signature for aount i dened in equation 2.3.1 is stated as
Pi(Xi) = Pi(Xi,1)Pi(Xi,2|Xi,1)Pi(Xi,3|Xi,1, Xi,2)Pi(Ai|Xi,3, Xi,1, Xi,2). (3.2.1)
Let pk,l,m be the histogram for k
th
ategory of X1, l
th
ategory of X2 and m
th
ategory of X3. Figure 3.1 shows the idea of a signature for one aount. The
gure presents the data in the example data above. There are in total 25
repairs. 80% of them are heap, 20% expensive (P (X1)). This is presented
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Figure 3.1: Signature. Histogram p∗,∗,∗ represents the histogram of variable
X1 (Cost) when no onditionalization has been made. pE,e,h on the other
hand presents the onditional histogram of daily repair volume when X1 =
Expensive, X2 = Easy and X3 = One hour.
as histogram p∗,∗,∗. Furthermore, 100% of the heap repairs are easy and 45%
of those are done within 3 hours, showing that the shortest repair time is the
most preferred. Analysis on these repairs shows that either 2, 3 or 4 repairs
are usually performed eah day.
It is important to understand the struture behind the signature beause fraud
an be deteted within one volume histogram (P (A)) or within some ategor-
ial histogram, and the hanges that reveal the fraud should be monitored.
Furthermore, the use of a umulative variable suh as daily laim volume
reates an issue in the signature reation proess. Conditioning with more
variables splits the volumes to smaller ounts and this means that the volume
histograms need to be set every time a onditional variable is added. Fig-
ure 3.2 gives a graphial example of the omponent P (A|X1) of an average
signature alulated over the whole dataset. The gure only shows the his-
tograms onditioned over only one variable with seven attributes used in the
empirial results setion.
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Figure 3.2: Average signature. Histograms present the onditional probabilities
of daily volumes, onditioned on one variable P (A|V1).
3.3 Signature distane
Based on a review of the data, the Jensen dierene divergene measure (2.3.8)
was hosen as the primary distane measure. Creation of the signatures showed
that several signatures in fat do not ll all the signature omponents. Thus
zero probabilities are an important part of the signature and the distane
measure must treat zero values orretly. Jensen measure onsiders the zero
values more orretly than other measures.
When the histogram distribution is based on daily laim volumes the fraud
analyst may wish to weight the high volumes more than the low volumes.
This aims to detet the most expensive hanges from the manufaturer's point
of view. As a distane measure, one an use the square root of weighted Jensen
dierene divergene measure
DWJENSEN(P,Q) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
αi
(
pi log pi + qi log qi
2
− (
pi + qi
2
) log (
pi + qi
2
)
)
,
(3.3.1)
where
∑
i αi = 1.
The Jensen measure only gives the dissimilarity measure for one histogram.
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Beause the outlying behavior an be revealed in dierent signature ompo-
nents, an outlier sore should be alulated for eah omponent separately.
Using the weighted Jensen dierene divergene measure the dierene of sig-
natures Y1 and Y2 in omponent A is
DA(Y1, Y2) =
K∑
i=1
DWJENSEN(Y1,i, Y2,i), (3.3.2)
where K is the number of histograms in omponent A. The total distane of
signatures Dtot is then alulated as
Dtot(Y1, Y2) =
∑
i
βiDi(Y1,i, Y2,i), i = {X1, X2, X3, A}. (3.3.3)
The weighting parameter β is needed beause the omponent distanes (3.3.3)
are not omparable. The number of bins in histograms varies in dierent
omponents and thus summing in signature distanes in equation (3.3.1) gives
dierent values for dierent omponents. Beause the nature of fraud is not
known, eah signature omponent should be given the same emphasis. The
parameter β is estimated using the average of omponent-wise distanes
1
βA
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
DA(Yi, Yj)/N
2, (3.3.4)
where N is the number of aounts. Another way to alulate the total distane
is to normalize the distanes.
3.4 Modiations to fraud detetion with sig-
natures
As disussed in setion 2.4.1, the most ommon metri in lustering is the
Eulidean distane. Beause Eulidean distane is not usable with histogram
signatures (2.3.3), weighted Jensen dierene divergene (3.3.1) measure is
used instead of the Eulidean distane.
Weighted Jensen dierene divergene measure an replae Eulidean distane
also in peer group analysis. In literature, variane and distane of aounts
determine the peer groups. Variane and entropy both an be onsidered as
a measure of unertainty. Similarly, entropy was dened by Shannon as a
measure of unertainty [43℄.
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Peer group statistis (2.4.7) and (2.4.8) in setion 2.4.4 dene the behavior of
a peer group. For signatures, the variable dening the behavior is the same
as the signature probability Ai,j = P (Ai,j|Y ), where Y is a set of ondition-
ing variables. Beause the preferred dierene measure is weighted Jensen
dierene divergene measure, a better group variane for the group of Xj is
Vi =
1
npeer − 1
npeer∑
j=1
DWJENSEN(Xj, Ti), (3.4.1)
and the outlier sore thus beomes
Ci = DV
−1
i D (3.4.2)
Equation 3.4.2 gives the suspiion sores for eah updated day. Beause this
sore inludes also the distane from peers, this distane easily overrules the
hanges happening in the group and the member that has the highest distane
in the beginning of the peer group analysis remains to have the highest sore.
Removing the initial distanes from the aount sores gives a better indiator
on the atual hanges. Thus the nal outlier sore is
Ci = DV
−1
i D−D0 (3.4.3)
3.5 Outlier summary and performane mea-
sure
Loal outlier fator method and peer group as fraud detetion methods re-
quire a proper guess of the number of peers used. However, when there is
no knowledge of how many peers should be ompared, lustering seems the
most intuitive hoie. When lustering is used for outlier detetion, a ommon
method is to alulate the sore as the distane to the luster enter 2.4.1.
Beause of the data struture (setion 3.1) and the type of fraud (setion 3.6),
it is diult to bring out the most important outliers. Some forms of fraud
might be aused by the dierenes only in the distribution of one variable, while
other forms of fraud only appear in the most spei level of ategorization.
The best way to make sure that all fraud types are deteted is to alulate a
suspiion sore on eah variable level.
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The outlier identiation system requires several parameters that the user has
to dene. These parameters are based on environmental fators. Table 3.4
summarizes the parameters used in this system.
Table 3.4: System parameters
Parameter type Parameter Explanation
Weight parameters
α Histogram information weight
β Component weight
w Group divergene weight
Group parameters
k Number of nearest neighbors
N Number of lusters
Beause the purpose of outlier detetion is to nd the most suspiious aounts
the rank ri,n of the reated fraudulent aountXi is used as a performane mea-
sure. The smaller the rank, the sooner the aount will be taken under fraud
investigation and the monetary losses that inrease over time are minimized.
3.6 Fraud indiators in warranty fraud
The method used in fraud detetion needs to trak several types of suspiious
indiators. The performane is estimated based on the ability to disover all
of them. The following fraud indiators need to be overed.
• Abnormal behavior
 High volume - Aount transations are higher than for peer a-
ounts
 Varying fous - Aount transations do not distribute similarly
than peer aounts
• Behavioral hange
 Volume hange - Aount transation volumes inrease from normal
level
 Fous hange - Aount transations
• Single outliers
 Sudden high values - Aount transations are expeted but sur-
prisingly high in volume
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 Unobserved value - Combination of variables is unknown from the
past
Term suh as "normal level", is not easy to determine. Normal level suggests
that the level is alulated from some data where there is no fraudulent a-
tivity involved. But beause the fraudulene of the data annot be onrmed,
the unertainty that the fraudulent data points bring needs to be aepted.
Furthermore, there are several ways to dene the normal level, for instane,
one an use the medoid or entroid as a normal referene [4℄. In short, the
omparison depends greatly on the used denition of similarity.
The tested fraud aounts are reated as a ombination of real aounts and
simulate the outlying behavior. This way we an also estimate the performane
of the similarity measurement. The reation of the tested aounts is explained
in more detail in setion 4.2 and Appendix A.2.
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Chapter 4
Performane of methods
This setion presents studied methods with real data. First, the signature ini-
tialization proess is disussed step-by-step. Seond, signatures are tested with
lustering and loal outlier methods. Finally, peer group analysis is performed
using signatures. The data olleting and struturing before initialization is
handled with Qlikview 9.0 [37℄. The main analysis; signature reation, outlier
detetion and nally peer group analysis are performed with MATLAB [38℄.
4.1 Signature initialization
4.1.1 Dataset
The pre-modiations to the data were desribed in hapter 3. The number
of onditioning variables was limited to three variables. Furthermore, there
was only a limited amount of data available for signature initialization and
lustering, and then further to proof the performane of peer group analysis.
Table 4.1 shows the dataset information available for this thesis. Learning
data refers to the signature initialization and lustering data, and testing data
refers to the peer group analysis data.
Table 4.1: Dataset for outlier detetion
Variable Learning data Testing data
Number of days 141 45
Number of aounts 73 65
Number of transations 2 062 475 509 972
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As an be seen from table 4.1, some aounts did not ontribute to the testing
data. These aounts most likely are quite small in volume and an be kept
in the learning data without endangering the data quality. In addition, the
dataset was modied aording to table A.1 to assure that there are outlying
behavior in the data.
When analyzing the data, logarithmi values of laim volumes were used. The
distribution of logarithmi laim volumes is lose to normal distribution, whih
enables more reliable analysis results than using plain volumes.
4.1.2 Creating the signature
The rst step in reating the signature is to nd a proper ategorization and
histogram bin ount for this ategorization. As disussed in setion 2.3.1, the
optimal histogram for a dataset maximizes the AWKL-distane (2.3.7) over
all aounts and against some target behavior. Beause there is no fraudulent
target data available, an average of the whole dataset is assumed as the tar-
get behavior. The weighting for AWKL-distane should be balaned so that
individual behavior is identied without losing the grouping information (se-
tion 2.3.3), meaning that the weighting should be lose to 0.5. The number of
bins in the optimal histogram also limits the signature reation. The higher the
bin ount, the more omputationally demanding the analysis. Another point
to be addressed is how and with whih variables the data is ategorized. If
the ategorization does not bring any additional information or is inaurate,
ategorization is useless.
Let the rst ategorization be done with variableX1. Figure 4.1 shows how the
bin ount of the optimal histogram inreases when the weighting in AWKL-
distane inreases. The possible bin ount has been limited to hundred bins.
Figure shows that with weight 0.4 the optimal bin ount is 16. When w > 0.5,
the optimal bin ount is so high that inluding this in the analysis would be
very ineient. Based on this gure, weight 0.4 would be hosen as the AWKL
weighting. The optimal bin ount is alulated over a set of histograms. The
left graph of gure 4.2 shows how the histogram with bin ount 16 reahes a
little higher information entropy value than other histogram bin ounts. When
alulating the histograms, bin sizes of equal widths has been assumed.
The next step in signature reation is to determine the proper set of ondi-
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Figure 4.1: Development of the bin ount and information entropy against
weighting parameter w.
tioning variables for analysis. This proess was explained in setion 2.3.1. The
problem of using volumes when deteting outliers is that the same histograms
that were employed when examining the total volumes annot be used, be-
ause the daily volumes are sattered over the onditioning variables. Thus
the optimal histogram bin ount needs to be determined for eah ombination
of variables separately.
Table 4.2 shows the χ2 test results for eah ombination of variables. First,
eah onditioning variable was tested separately. If eah variable was proven
signiant, the one with the best test results was taken as the rst onditioner
and another onditioning variable was inluded in the analysis. If the om-
binations of variables were proven signiant, the data was analyzed with all
three onditioning variables. The χ2 test results show that the best level of
information is ahieved when the data is onditioned with all the possible vari-
ables. The results from the signiane test are good. As an be seen also from
the results, when the onditioning happens over all the variables, the order of
variables is not relevant, beause the same histograms are built in every ase.
Variable ombination that has the best results and still meets the signiane
requirements is hosen as the nal ombination. Table 4.2 summarizes the
results.
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Figure 4.2: Optimized bin ount for daily histograms with variable X1
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of p-values. It shows the perentage of a-
ounts that pass the test with a spei p-value. X-axis in the gure has a
square root -sale. The gure shows that for majority of aounts the on-
ditioning is very signiant but the inrease in signiane level is quite slow
after that. Development for the p-value was similar to all the ombinations of
onditioning variables.
When the onditioning is done with all the variables, the optimal bin ount is
obtained with AWKL-weight 0.6. The development of the weighting against
the maximal information entropy is shown in gure B.1. The optimal bin ount
is now 11 (left graph in gure 4.4). It should be noted, that the histogram
with this set up is highly skewed towards the low values of laiming volumes
(right graph in gure 4.4), just like was disussed above.
4.2 Clustering and nearest neighbor methods
Two additional aounts were reated to test the performane of dierent lus-
tering and anomaly detetion methods. These anomalous aounts were re-
ated to represent two approahes, signatures with suspiiously high volumes
and signatures where the distribution of repairs is abnormal i.e. the aount
has abnormal behavior (setion 3.6). More detailed explanations of the re-
ation of these aounts is in appendix A.2.
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Figure 4.4: Optimized bin ount for daily histograms with all variables
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Table 4.2: Perentage of aounts for whih the χ2 test results were signiant
(< 0.05) or highly signiant (< 0.01). Test results are alulated for eah
variable ombination separately.
Variable <0.01 signiane <0.05 signiane
X1 67.1% 71.2%
X2 66.7% 68.0%
X3 76.7% 76.7%
X3 | X1 78.1% 78.1%
X3 | X2 76.7% 76.7%
X3 | X1 | X2 72.6% 76.7%
X1 | X2 | X3 72.6% 76.7%
Before soring the outliers with lustering method, the lusters need to be re-
ated. The number of lusters has a great impat on the eieny of lustering.
The number of lusters should be suh that the luster struture minimizes the
lost information. Figure 4.5 shows how the summarized and average distane
of data objets develops when the number of lusters inreases. Distanes of
lusters are based on the Jensen dierene divergene measure (3.3.3). Sil-
houette oeient, whih was disussed in setion 2.4.1, reahes its maximum
already with two luster. As an be seen from the gure, the derease of aver-
age distane from luster enters is the fastest when there are only two lusters.
The analysis will be based on two lusters.
Figure 4.6 presents the lusters. The aount distanes are saled to two di-
mensions to visualize the distanes in a graphial form. The outlying aounts
that were reated for performane analysis are highlighted in the gure. A
ready-made lustering funtion in MATLAB alled kmeans (see MATLAB
help in [32℄) was used to identify the lusters. The gure shows that the lus-
tering method does not nd lusters that would be easily disovered. On the
ontrary, the lusters are mostly seleted based on the horizontal position in
the gure.
4.2.1 Outlier detetion
One way to sore the aounts is to order the aounts by the distane from
others in the same luster. Figure 4.7 presents these distanes for eah aount.
The greater the distane is from others, the more suspiious is the aount. As
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Figure 4.5: Average and sum of distanes of luster members as a funtion of
luster ount.
an be seen from the gure, the reated anomalous aounts are observed quite
well by the lustering method, i.e. they loate far from their luster enter.
The behavioral outlier is deteted as the most suspiious ase and the aount
with high repair volume is identied as the 15th most suspiious.
As disussed in setion 2.4.3, loal outlier fator onsiders the loal dierenes
of aounts better than lustering and should be able to identify the reated
outliers more eiently. Figure 4.8 shows the loal outlier fators of the a-
ounts. The distanes of aounts have been alulated with equation (3.3.3),
similarly to the lustering method. Aording to literature, the loser the sore
is to one, the more normal the observation. Again, the aount reated with
abnormal repair volume reeives a high sore. This time it is identied as the
ninth biggest outlier. This behavioral outlier is the most suspiious aount.
The results of loal outlier fator analysis an be understood better by look-
ing at the gure 4.6. The aount with abnormal behavior loates far from
all its lose neighbors and thus reeives a high sore. Aount with abnormal
volume loates in a neighborhood of two other aounts but the next losest
aounts are relatively far. The results were alulated onsidering ten los-
est neighbors, resulting in giving groups of three aounts a high loal outlier
fator. Furthermore, it should be noted that both outlier detetion methods,
loal outlier fator and luster distane based sore gives similar results over
the whole group of aounts. Most aounts with a high sore in one method
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Figure 4.6: Clusters presented in two dimensions. Projetion to two dimensions
is done with multidimensional saling. The distane riterion used in matlab
lustering was metris stress([32℄).
also have a high sore in the other.
To ompare the eieny of these two outlier detetion methods, aounts were
sored also by alulating the average distane from ten of their losest peers
and this distane is presented as an outlier sore (setion 2.4.2). Figure 4.9
shows these sores. This method gives a high sore for many aounts and fails
to emphasize the importane of outlying behaviors as eiently as lustering
or loal outlier fator methods. Although the reated outliers reeive a high
sore, the sores of several other aounts are lose to the outliers.
The performane measure of the methods was disussed in setion 3.5. Rank
of the reated outliers was stated as the performane measure in this ontext.
Table 4.3 summarizes the performane of the dierent methods. The behav-
ioral outlier was sored as the most suspiious aount by all the methods.
The volume based outlier was best deteted with loal outlier fators.
Table 4.3: Ranks of the reated outliers in outlier analysis
Outlier type Clustering LOF PG distane
Volume outlier 15 9 17
Behavioral outlier 1 1 1
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4.3 Behavioral hange detetion
After the initial outliers are disovered, the aounts that address a hange in
their behavior an be deteted. The dataset is updated with 45 days of real
testing data and the peer group analysis (setions 2.4.4 and 3.4) is run after
eah updated day to follow the suspiiousness of aount hanges. The peer
group alulations are based on the total distane of aounts (3.3.3) and no
weighting (2.3.1) was used in the update proess.
The performane of behavioral hange detetion method is analyzed similarly
as for the lustering and loal outlier fator methods. Test aounts were
reated to represent dierent outlier types. There are four test aounts; one
for sudden high volume in an attribute that has had only low volumes to
represent an aount with a single volume outlier, one for a repair type that
the aount has not performed earlier to represent an aount that tries to opy
the behavior of another aount, one for ontinuous inrease in repair volumes
and one for hange in distribution of repairs. More detailed desription of
reation of the outliers an be seen in Appendix A.2.
As disussed in setion 3.4, the emphasis in the analysis is on deteting be-
havioral hanges and thus the situation in the beginning of the analysis is not
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Figure 4.10: Aount hanges during the updating proess. The arrows point
out the peer group analysis values for eah reated suspiious aount
relevant. Figure 4.10 shows both the starting situation and the level of hange
in the peer group analysis value. The upper graph shows how suspiious the
aounts have been in the beginning of the analysis. The graph shows results
that are very similar to the peer distane gure 4.9. The bottom graph shows
the nal peer group values from the analysis, alulated with (3.4.3). How this
peer group analysis value evolved an be seen in gure B.2. Only the graphs
for the ve aounts that hanged the most are shown. From the bottom graph
in gure 4.10 it an be seen that aount number 49 has hanged the most
ompared to others. Even if the hange in peer group value has been negative,
meaning that the behavior of the aount has moved loser towards its peers,
the drivers behind this hange should be investigated. Moreover, the graph
shows that the reated aount with hanging laiming behavior reeives a
high peer group analysis value. This aount shows up as the fourth most
suspiious aount.
Figure 4.11 shows the hanges of eah signature omponent over time for the
aount number 49. The hanges in eah omponent of the signature are shown
separately. The hange of this aount in two omponents is higher than for
any other aount. However, majority of this hange has ourred only in three
days of updates. These high hanges imply that the historial volume of the
aount is low, and one day an impat the signature greatly. An examination
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of the hanges of the other aounts, either strongly dashed (peer aounts
for aount 49) or thin dashed aounts, shows that there are several other
aounts that perform similarly, i.e., are having a great hange during one day.
Further analysis onrmed that when laims are updated to the aount with
only few historial data points, the signature is likely to hange a lot.
The hanges for the reated outliers were also analyzed. These hanges for the
signature omponents of eah outlier aount are presented in gures B.4 - B.6
in Appendix B. The hanges for these aounts stay moderate beause all the
aounts hosen for outliers had a proper historial signature before updating.
Only the aount with hanging behavior the hanges are signiant but similar
jumps as for aount 49 annot be seen. The aount with inreasing laiming
volume starts to get inreasing hange values in omponents 2 and 3 as well
as in the basi signature omponent. If the peer group analysis were to be
ontinued longer, this aount would appear in the results. This means that
the volumes start to hange signiantly enough only after about 15 days of
growth (see table A.1 for explanation of the outlier reation). Beause the level
of hange appears to be insuient, the outlying aount ould be regenerated
with a greater hange. However, in real world fraud ases, aount volumes do
not have drasti hanges, but the volumes inrease slowly. Thus great volume
inrease would not be justied in the analysis.
The aounts that have single suspiious transations are not identied as
outliers. The aount with sudden high volume (gure B.6) had the inrease
in volume on day 25. This appears as a hange only in omponent 1 and
omponent 2, although similar hanges an be observed already within the
original transations of the aount. The aount with laims that it has
never laimed earlier does not show signiant hanges in omponent values
either (gure B.7).
Table 4.4: Simulation results for the reated outliers
Outlier type PG distane PG analysis
Changing volume (36) 47
Changing behavior (75) 4
Volume outlier (30) 35
Behavior outlier (4) 29
Table 4.4 summarizes the peer group analysis performane. The rank of eah
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Figure 4.11: Aount hanges for the aount that hanged the most aording
to peer group analysis. Changes are presented for eah signature omponent
separately. The strongly dashed lines present the hanges of the peer aounts
and the shallow dashed lines present all the other aounts.
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tested outlier aount is presented in the seond olumn. The peer group
distane ranks are presented as a referene. The table emphasizes the fat
that peer group analysis fails to identify other outliers exept the behavioral
hange outlier. This outlier is deteted well and is pointed out as the fourth
suspiious aount.
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Chapter 5
Summary and onlusions
This thesis presented a fraud detetion method for warranty laim fraud. The
presented method was tailored to t the existing apabilities and needs of an
international eletronis manufaturing ompany. The aim for the method
was to detet those repair vendors whose repairing behavior is more suspiious
than others'. Identifying the vendors with possible fraudulent behavior would
bring the ompany monetary benets in terms of prevented losses.
The approah taken in this thesis was based on the assumption that, from sta-
tistial point of view, when no speial rules apply, no repair partner is unique
by performane. Based on this, histogram based signatures that prole eah
partner separately, were presented. Histogram signatures are histogram prob-
ability distributions of seleted dimensions. Histogram signatures t well to
the data and bring a new approah to looking at the data with onditional his-
tograms of daily repair volumes. The advantages of this method are simpliity
and eient use of memory, while the only thing that needs to be saved is the
histogram bin value. However, already with the data used in this thesis the
number of possible onditioning ategories was so high that the omputations
were quite laborious. If the number of ategories inreases muh, the similarly
behaving partners should be divided into partial analysis groups. This, on the
other hand, would derease the visibility that inluding all partners to one
analysis brings.
The seletion of ategories has been emphasized not only relating to ompu-
tational eieny but also in relation to the reliability of the results. The
χ2 test that was presented with the variable seletion is not onsidering all
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the aounts and ategories when making the deision of inluding a variable.
The empty histograms and empty mutual bins of histograms are removed in
the beginning of the test for eah aount [12℄. The data used in the thesis
is very sattered, and for many aounts several ategories are empty. If only
for example ten ategories out of 1535 ategories reate a positive result, the
result is not very valid and this type of aount will reeive a high importane
in hange detetion beause every new observation may shift the histogram
distribution greatly. Another type of test would be needed that would take
also the hange possibility into aount.
The methods presented in this thesis only sueed to identify ertain type
of outliers. It detets deviation based outliers well, meaning the aounts for
whih the behavior is dierent from others. This applies to both phases; to the
initial analysis where the aounts were analyzed with lustering and nearest
neighbor methods, and to the peer group analysis where the hange in behavior
was alulated against the aounts own behavior, i.e. signature. However, the
results imply that the deviation from others must be wide. If the deviation
only appears in one spei aount harateristis, normal behavior in other
harateristis rules out the strange behavior. The same implies also for the
single outliers, whose impat is not suient to raise suspiion for longer period
of time.
Histogram signatures tend to identify abnormalities and hanges well when
the number of variable attributes is low. In this ase, the dierenes an be
seen easily. For instane, although not written in the results setion, during
the thesis signature analysis on one variable proved to be more valuable than
analysis where all the variables were inluded. This thesis did not onentrate
on only one signature omponent, beause the total signature dierenes were
analyzed, but the emphasis should be put to one omponent at a time in the
future.
Although the methods ould not identify all the reated outliers, it should be
kept in mind that the reation of outliers ould have been awed also. For in-
stane, the formulation ould have been more random. Now the reation was
as random as possible, but all the outlying aounts that needed to be reated
using the original set of data were invented, resulting in possibly unrealisti
outliers. On the other hand, as the used data was atual data from a manu-
faturer's database, all the aounts themselves an already inlude outlying
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behavior.
An interesting topi for future development of the method is how to identify
the most important hanges from the manufaturing ompany's perspetive.
For example some type of weighting system for the most expensive hanges
or attributes is worth studying. This thesis presented only one way to weight
the dierent omponents of the signature, by improving the weighting the
performane of the method may improve a lot.
From nanial perspetive an important improvement would be to inlude the
ost savings dimension to the analysis. It was seen in the hapter 4 that the
peer group analysis now identies best the hanges in small volume aounts.
Very often these aounts are not the most interesting. For ost optimiza-
tion, some type of prie tag ould be inluded to the peer group analysis, by
analyzing the ost of daily repairs instead of repair volumes for instane.
To onlude, this thesis sueeded to fulll its objetives. A new approah
to warranty fraud detetion was presented and the method is able to detet
the most important fraud indiators. The method has already been put in
pratie in the manufaturing ompany and it has managed to identify some
major dierenes in repair vendors.
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Appendix A
Explanations
A.1 Denitions
Distribution based outliers. Data is assumed to follow some standard distri-
bution, and the outlier fator for eah data instane is alulated against this
distribution. These methods are most useful when the data olletion proess
is stritly ontrolled [26℄.
Distane based outliers. Objets that are distant from other data [27℄. The
number of ompared data objets varies, some tehniques alulate the dis-
tane to a limited number of losest neighbors, while other tehniques take the
distane to all data objets into aount.
Deviation based outliers are found by studying the harateristis of data ob-
jets and identifying the objets with deviating features [26℄.
Density based outliers. Loal outlier fator (LOF) that points data objets
with sare neighborhoods as outliers was rst presented by Breunig et al. [7℄.
Depth based outliers appear when data objets are layered in the data spae
and the layers are ompared against eah other. Outliers are assumed to lie in
shallow layers [28℄.
Clustering based outliers an be identied with some lustering method that
is able to detet small and large lusters. Objest in small lusters or lusters
relatively far from others are regarded as outliers [24℄.
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Pearson's hi-squared (χ2) test an be used to ompare the statistial signi-
ane of the dierenes in datasets. Traditionally χ2 test studies if a dataset
is following some hosen hypothesis [29℄.
A.2 Created anomalous aounts
Table A.1: Test ase reation for simulations. The performane of the parent
aounts used in the the reation of the test aounts an be ompared against
the performane of the reated aounts. The method should rank the reated
aounts with a smaller rank than the parent aounts.
ISSUE Volume related issue Behavior related issue
Abnormality The data for aount 1 is in-
reased with the datapoints that
have fairly high volume. This new
aount is marked as aount 74.
Combination of aounts that have
reported only some of the rst seven
attributes for variable 2. This om-
bined aount was given the aount
number 75.
Change related The repair ativities for aount
24 are inreased slightly from
their normal level on eah day
it performs repairs. The inreas-
ing begins after day 10 and eah
day the repairs are inreased with
10%.
Aounts 11 and 26 are ombined
before peer group analysis and made
to perform like aount 28 after the
behavior analysis starts. This om-
bination of aounts has the aount
number 76.
Single outlier The aount for this outlier was
hosen randomly. Aount 62 was
hosen. For a random day, ho-
sen day 25, the maximum volume
of that aount was inreased 10
times.
The aount was hosen randomly.
Aount 10 was hosen. For a ran-
dom day, hosen day 19, the aount
was given transations it had not re-
ported earlier.
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Figure B.1: Development of the bin ount and information entropy against
weighting parameter w.
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Figure B.2: Peer group analysis (PGA) results for the ve most hanged a-
ounts.
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Figure B.3: Aount hanges for the aount that hanged the most aording
to peer group analysis(aount 49). Changes are presented for eah signature
omponent separately. The strongly dashed lines present the hanges of the
peer aounts and the shallow dashed lines present all the other aounts.
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Figure B.4: Aount hanges for the reated outlier that hanges the behavior
right from the beginning of the peer group analysis (aount 76). Changes are
presented for eah signature omponent separately. The strongly dashed lines
present the hanges of the peer aounts and the shallow dashed lines present
all the other aounts.
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Figure B.5: Aount hanges for the reated outlier with hanging volume
(aount 24). Changes are presented for eah signature omponent separately.
The strongly dashed lines present the hanges of the peer aounts and the
shallow dashed lines present all the other aounts.
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Figure B.6: Aount hanges for the aount that had a single day with surpris-
ingly high laim volume (aount 62). Changes are presented for eah signature
omponent separately. The strongly dashed lines present the hanges of the
peer aounts and the shallow dashed lines present all the other aounts.
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Figure B.7: Aount hanges for the aount that had a single day with surpris-
ing laims (aount 10). Changes are presented for eah signature omponent
separately. The strongly dashed lines present the hanges of the peer aounts
and the shallow dashed lines present all the other aounts.
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